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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent 
vs. 
DAVID RILEY JACOB, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 18173 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, David Riley Jacob, appeals from the finding 
and order of the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, entered August 7, 1981. 
DISPOSITION ]N THE LOWER COURT 
The above captioned matter came before the Court on the 
appellant's motion for a hearing to review whether or not his 
sanity had been restored. On August 7, 1981, the Honorable Christine 
M. Durham found as a fact that the appellant had not recovered from 
his mental illness and ordered that the appellant continue to be 
maintained at the Utah State Hospital. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks to have the order of the District Court 
that he continue to be maintained at the Utah State Hospital pursuant 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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to §77-14-5, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended) vacated. 
Appellant seeks an order releasing him from the custody 
of the Utah State Hospital as having recovered his 
sanity pursuant to former §77-24-16, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as 
amended: repealed July 1, 1980). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On April 15, 1980, the appellant was found not guilty by 
reason of insanity on a charge of aggravated arson, a second degree 
felony. (4/15/80 T.3. See also stipulation of facts for trial 
entered into by both the prosecution and defense.) On that day 
the trial court remanded the appellant to the custody of the 
sheriff, providing that his custody be maintained at the Utah State 
Hospital. This committment was pursuant to §77-24-15, Utah Code 
Ann. (1953 as amended, repealed July 1, 1980) pending a determina-
tion under the same statute as to "whether or not the defendant 
has fully recovered his sanity" (4/15/80 T.5). In its order of 
May 6, 1980, the court appointed two individuals to help the court 
make its determination. The court ordered that both examiners 
report concerning the restoration of sanity under the definition 
as follows: 
The defendant's sanity is such that he is no 
longer a danger to himself or others. 
A hearing on this matter was held July 18, 1980. After 
hearing evidence and argument, the court ordered the appellant 
transported back to the state hospital to be maintained there 
pending its ruling, (7/18/80 T.67). On January 30, 1981, the court 
made the following finding of fact and conclusions of law: 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That the def:eridari1: David Riley Jacob suffers 
from a mental illness called schizophrenia. 
2. That his condition is chronic. 
3. That this condition can be treated and is 
currently being treated by the use of antipsycotic 
drugs and that when the defendant is treated with 
these drugs his symptoms of this disease subside. 
4. That when defendant's symptoms of· his mental 
illness subside hathinks and acts as a person who 
is sane. 
5. That when defendant does not receive medication 
symptoms of his ch~oriic mental illness reappear and 
he then is insane and is a danger to himself and 
others. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The defendant having submitted stipulated facts 
to the Court, April 15, 1980, the crime having 
occurred September 21, 1979, and the Court having 
found the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity 
April 15, 1980, the defendant is therefore entitled 
to have determination on the question of his current 
mental state to be made according to the statutes 
in effect on the date of the trial, that being 
§77-24-15, Utah Code Ann (as amended) and which has 
since been amended on July 1, 1980. 
2. The language of that section of the code 
requires that the "Court shall determine whether 
or not the defendant has fully [sic] recmvered 
his - s_ani ty. " 
3. The Court does not accept defendant's definition 
of sanity that sanity for purposes of this hearing 
be based on the opposite condition of the "defense 
of insanity" as defined in §76-2-305(1) that is[sic] 
shall be a defense that the defendant "at the time 
of the prescrib'ed conduct as a result of mental 
disease or defect lack substantial capacity either 
to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or 
to conform his conduct to the requirements of 
law." 
4. The Court finds that sanity although not defined 
in the procedural section of the code in effect at 
the time should be a standard similiar to the standard 
used in civil proceedings. Therefore the standard 
used by this Court basically is that the defendant 
should be reasonably expected to not be a threat or 
a danger of harm to himself or to others in the 
foreseeable future. 
THE COURT HEREBY CONCLUDES that the defendant, 
-3-
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DAVID RILEY JACOB, suffers from a chronic mental 
illness and finds with regard to the issue of 
whether or not he has fully recovered his sanity 
the following: 
1. That when the defendant;. DAVID RILEY JACOB, 
is being maitained with antipsychotic medication 
he is in a condition which meets the test of 
sanity and therefore is recovered. 
2. That when the defendant, DAVID RILEY JACOB, 
is not being maintained with antipsychotic 
medicine his condition does not meet the test 
of sanity and therefore has not recovered his 
sanity. 
The riourt also issued an order of conditional release 
providing that the defendant be released from the Utah State 
Hospital upon terms and conditions advised by the staff and under 
the supervision of Adult Parole and Probation. This release was 
to be on the specific condition that he be maintained on anti-
psycotic medicine at a level enabling him to remain sane or be 
returned immediately to the custody of the Utah State Hospital. 
The appellant was never released pursuant to that order. 
On June 2, 1981, the appellant requested a hearing pursuant 
to §77-24-16, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended, repealed July 1, 
1980) to review whether or not his sanity had been restored. That 
hearing was held July 22, 1981. The court issued its order on 
August 7, 1981'. 
In that order the court vacated its previous order of 
conditional release and found that, based on the evidence presented, 
the findings of fact and conclusions of law entered January 30, 
1981 were still applicable. The court made the following additional 
findings of fact and conclusions 6f ·law: 
-4..., 
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1981. 
The defendant suffers from a chronic mental 
illness which apparently has a biochemical 
cause and psychological and behavioral mani-
festations. He is not now, and will in all 
likelihood never be, recovered from the bio-
chemical aspects of the disease. However, 
it appears that so long as he receives an 
appropriate maintenance dosage of medication, 
his psychological and behavioral manif esta-
tions disappear. Historically, he has on 
many occasions failed to maintain his medi-
cation level when not institutionalized, 
and he has consequently (and in every instance) 
become psychotic. In that condition, there 
is no question, based upon the historical 
information, that he is extraordinarily danger-
ous to others and to himself. 
Under the circumstances just described, this 
court cannot find that the defendant has~~ 
recovered from his mental illness within the 
. meaning of the Utah statutes, and orders that 
the defendant continue to be maintained at the 
Utah State Hospital. Since there is no like-
lihood that a cure for defendant's illness 
will be discovered soon, the above ruling may 
well result in the lifetime institutionaliza-
tion of an individual who could function 
adequately, and without danger, in the community, 
if his medication were carefully and closely 
supervised. However, no means of lawful super-
vision appears to exist at this time, and some 
revision of existing law would seem to be 
required before the defendant in his present 
condition could be released. (Emphasis 
added.) 
The appellant appealed from this order on September 1, 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS APPLICATION OF 
§77-14-5, UTAH CODE ANN. (1953 AS AMENDED, 
EFFECTIVE JULY 1, 1980) TO THIS ACTION. BE-
CAUSE THIS CASE WAS ALREADY PENDING AT THE 
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TIME §77-14-5 TOOK EFFECT, FORMER '§77-24-15 
AND §77-24-16 APPLY BY VIRTURE OF THE UNITED 
STATES AND UTAH CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITIONS 
AGAINST EX POST FACTO LAWS. 
The United States ConstittwtionArticle I, §10 and the Utah 
Constitution Article I, §18 prohibit the enactment of ex post 
facto laws. Laws have been found to violate this prohibition which 
retroaetiveiy, · increase the punishment for a crime, Lindsey v. 
Washington, 301 U.S. 397, 57 S.Ct. 797, 81 L.Ed 1182 (1937), or 
retroactively make changes in evidence and procedure which operate 
to the disadvantage of the criminal defendant. Thompson v. Missouri, 
171 U.S. 380, 18 S.Ct. 922, 43 L.E.2d 204 (1898). In particular, 
procedural changes have been found to violate this prohibition when 
they retroactively a·ffect a substantial right to which the accused 
was entitled at the time of his offense. Kring v. Missouri, 107 
U.S. 221, 2 S.Ct. 443, 27 L.Ed. 506 (1883). 
The new Utah Code of Criminal Procedure became effective 
July 1, 1980. Section 77-14-5 of that code provides: 
77-14-5. Hearing on mental condition of defendant 
found not guilty by reason of mental illness--
Commitment to state hospital--Subsequent hear-
ings. -- (l) When a jury renders a verdict of "not 
guilty by reason of mental illness" pursuant to 
section 76-2-305, the court shall proceed to 
determine whether the defendant has recovered 
from his mental illness. If, after hearing, 
the defendant is determined to be mentally ill, 
the court shall order him committed to the Utah 
state hospital. The defendant shall not be 
released from confinement therein until the 
court which committed the defendant shall, 
after hearing, find that the defendant has 
recovered from his mental illness. Notice 
shall be given to the prosecuting attorney 
of the hearing. 
(2) A defendant committed to the Utah state 
hospital pursuant:J. to subsection(!) may apply, 
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not sooner than six months from the date of the 
commitment, to the district court of the county 
from which he was committed, for an order of 
release on the grounds that he has recovered 
from his mental illness. At any time that the 
defendant has recovered from his mental illness, 
the clinical director of the state hospital shall 
certify that fact to the court. The court shall 
conduct a hearing within ten working days of the 
receipt of the clincal director's report. If 
the finding is adverse to the defendant, he shall 
not be permitted another hearing more often than 
once each year, unless the court otherwise orders. 
In such hearings, the burden of proof is on the 
applicant. (Emphasis added.) 
The applicable statutes in effect on September 27, 1979, the date 
the crime which gave rise to this action occurre~ were former 
§77-24-15 and §77-24-16: 
77-24-15. Verdict of not guilty by reason of 
insanity--Procedure.--Upon a verdict of not 
guilty by reason of insanity being rendered by 
a jury, the court shall determine whether or 
not the defendant has fully recovered his sanity, 
and the defendant shall be remanded to the 
custody of the sheriff until his sanity shall 
have been finally determined in the manner 
prescribed by law. If the defendant is com-
mitted to a state hospital he shall not be 
released from confinement, unless and until 
the court which committed him, or the district 
court of the county in which he is confined, 
shall, after notice and hearing, find and 
determine that his sanity has been restored. 
In the event such hearing is held in the county 
from which the defendant was committed, notice 
as ordered by the court shall be given to the 
district attorney for the district in which 
said county is located. In the event such 
hearing is held in the county where the 
defendant is confined, notice as ordered by 
by the court shall be given to the district 
attorney for the district in which said county 
is located, and also to the district attorney 
for the district in which the county is located 
from which said defendant was corrnnitted. 
-7-
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77-24-16. Application for release on ground 
sanity restored.--A person who has been committed 
to a state hospital, as provided in section 
77-24-15, may apply to the district court for 
the county in which he is confined or for the 
county from which he was committed, to be 
released on the ground that his sanity has been 
restorede No hearing upon such application 
shall be allowed a person until he shall have 
been confined for a period of not less than·. 
one year from the date of the order of commit-
ment, and if the finding of the court be adverse 
to him upon such, or any subsequent application 
for release, on the ground that his sanity has 
not been restored, he shall not be permitted to 
file a further application until one year has 
elapsed from the d~teof hearing upon his last 
preceeding application. In any hearing authorized 
by this section, the burden of proving that his 
sanity has been restored shall be upon the person 
applying for such hearing. 
·(Emphasis added.) 
The appellant maintains that the retroactive use of the 
new standard of "recovered from the mental illness" subjects him 
to a higher burden of proof in his case than the standard of 
"sanity has been restored." Thus its use operates to his dis-
advantage, deprives him of a substantial right to which he was 
entitled at the time of his offense, and comes within the consti-
tutional prohibitions. 
It is true that the ex post facto prohibition applies 
only to laws respecting criminal punishment. Johannessen v. 
United States, 225 U.S. 227, 32 S.Ct. 613, 56 L.Ed. 1066 (1912). 
Although the procedures for inquiry into the continuing 
insanity of a person acquitted by reason of insanity are not purely 
criminal in nature, they are at least quasi-criminal. They are 
part of the criminal code, they require notice to the district 
-8-
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attorney, and most importantly they involve involuntary incarcera-
tion as the result of the prior commission of a crime. 
The Washington Supreme Court applied this principle in 
Johnson v. Morris, 87 Wash.2d 922, 557 P.2d 1299 (1976). That 
case dealt with changes in the Washington State juvenile code. 
The court held that even though the juvenile code was not technically 
a criminal code and not punishment oriented, it did involve restraint 
of liberty and involuntary incarceration. The court held proceed-
ings under·the code were subject to the same strict constitutional 
scrutiny they wo:uld be if there were deemed "criminal proceedings" 
and involuntary incarceration under the code was punishment within 
the purview of the ex post facto prohibition. 557 P.2d at 1304, 
1305. 
Whether or not the appellant's mental health had been 
restored was both a subject of inquiry at the July 22, 1981 hearing 
and a basis for the t'rial court's order of August 7, 1981. It was 
error for the court to consider this standard in anywayin its 
determination since such a standard requires the appellant to 
show a higher degree of "wellness" than merely that he has been 
restored to his sanity. 
II 
TO THE EXTENT THE COURT BASED ITS DETERMINATION 
ON THE PROPER STANDARD OF WHETHER THE APPELLANT 
HAD BEEN RESTORED TO HIS SANITY, IT USED AN 
IMPROPER DEFINITION OF SANITY. 
_Although in its order of August 7, 1981, the c:ourt relied 
-9-
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on the new code's "restoration of mental health" inquiry, the 
court also found that is former order of January 30, 1981, relying 
of the proper inquiry of''restoration of sanity," was still appli-
aable. In that order the court had used a definition .of sanity 
similar to the standard used in civil proceedings "that the 
defendant should be reasonably expected to not be a threat or a 
danger of harm to himself or others in the foreseeable future." 
The defense counsel contends that this definition for 
"restoration of sanity" was clearly erroneous. The definition of 
the defense of mental disease or defect §76-2-305, the verdict 
returned against the appellant of not guilty by reason of insanity, 
§77-33-4 (repealed July 1, 1980) and the procedures to be taken 
following such a verdict are all part of th& Utah Criminal Code 
and the Utah Code of Criminal Procedure. §76-1-106 of the Criminal 
Code provides that "all provisions of the code. shall be 
construed according to the fair import of their terms to promote 
justice and to effect the objects of the law and general purposes 
of §76-1-104. Section 76-1-104(4) provides that one of those 
purposes is to "prevent arbitrary. or oppressive treatment of 
persons accused or convicted of offenses." In addition, § 68-3-11 
dealing with the rules of construction to be applied to the 1953 
codification of the Utah Code Annotated provides: 
68-3-11. Rules of construction as to words and 
phrases.--Words and phrases are to be construed 
according to the context and the approved usage 
of the language; but technical words and phrases, 
and such others as have acquired a peculiar and 
appropriate meaning in law, or are defined by 
statute, are to be construed according to such 
-10-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
peculiar and appropriate meaning or definition. 
Due process requires that meanings of statutes not be 
decided arbitrarily. In fact, protection from arbitrary govern-
mental action is the very essence of due process. Estate of Baker, 
222 Kan. 127, 563 P.2d 431 (1977), Thompson v. Harris, 107 Utah 99, 
152 P.2d 91 (1944). The Supreme Court of the United States has 
held that "no one may be required at peril of life, liberty or 
property to speculate at the meaning of penal statutes." Lanzetta 
v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453, 59 S.Ct. 618, 619, 83 L.Ed. 888, 
890 (1939). Further, it has held in accord with the Utah rules of 
construction that courts may construe statutes in terms of the 
text of the statutes and the subjects with which they deal. Connally 
v. General Construction, 269 U.S. 385, 46 S.Ct. 126, 70 L.Ed. 322 
(1926). See also Cannon v. McDonald, 615 P.2d 1268 (Utah 1980). 
There is no mention in the Utah Criminal Code or the Utah 
Code of Criminal Procedure of any standard of sanity based on an 
accused's potential for harm to himself or others. It appears 
from the record (4/15/80 T.7) that the court used this standard 
based on a mistaken reliance on several cases cited by the 
prosecutor (7/18/80 T.13,14,43,62, 65) and the letter of Dr. 
Austin dated June 24, 1980. These cases were Bolton v. Harris, 
395 F.2d 642 (D.C.Cir. 1968), Clark v. State, 151 Ga. App. 853, 
261 S.E. 2d 764 (1979), aff'd. 245 Ga. 629, 266 S.E.2d 466 (1980), 
and People v. Giles, 557 P.2d 408 (Colo. 1976). All of these 
cases dealt with statutory requirements not found in the correspond-
ing Utah scheme. 
The Bolton case held that a criminal acquitee must be 
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given a hearing after his acquittal by reason of insanity. The 
standard for release at that hearing was held to be as provided 
in the Washington, D.C. Code §24-301(3) 1967, to-wit: unconditional 
release requires the superintendent of the mental hospital to 
certify (1) that such person has recovered his sanity, and (2) 
in the opinion of the superintendent such person will not in the 
reasonable future be dangerous to himself or others (emphasis 
added). 
The Clark case dealt with a Georgia standard for release 
of an insanity acquitee based on whether or not the person was 
still mentally ill so as to authorize his involuntary commitment 
under the Georgia Code Ann. §88-50l(a) and (v) (Ga. L.1978, pp 1789-
1790). That code section provides that a mentally ill person 
requires involuntary treatment if he "l ... presents a substantial 
risk of imminent harm to himself or others as manifested by recent 
overt acts or recent expressed threats of violence which present 
II a probability of physical injury to himself or to other persons . . . . 
Although this case dealt with a schizophrenic, it is particularly 
inapplicable because the person had refused to take his medication 
two weeks before his hearing. The Giles case, cited by Dr. Austin, 
was decided under the Colorado statutory language of §16-8-120 
C.R.S. (1973), which requires for release of an insanity acquitee 
a finding that "the defendant has no abnormal mental condition 
which would be likely to cause him to be dangerous either to 
himself or to others or to the community in the reasonably foresee-
able future." While Giles held that it was permissable to have 
-12-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
different standards for being found not guilty by reason of 
insanity and being released following such a verdict, it certainly 
did not mandate such a difference. 
Even if the Utah c.ivil standard were applicable to this 
case, it would require not just a "foreseeable danger" but "an 
immediate danger" as required by the civil commitment standard 
of §64-7-36(10)(a) and (b), Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended). Dr. 
LeBegue testified that after cessation of medication "it may take 
months to a year for disorderly thinking, feeling, and behavior 
to occur" in the appellant (7/18/80 T.23,37-39). In fact, all 
the expert witnesses testified that the appellant did not meet 
the civil standard for commitment (Dr. LeBegue 7/18/80 T.18, Dr. 
Mirow and Dr. Austin 7/22/81 T.25,31). 
The various state statutory criteria for the release of 
insanity acquitees fall into four groups of inquiry: 1) Is the 
patient sane? 2) Is the patient not dangerous? 3) Is the patient 
I 
sane and not dangerouse? 4) Is the patient sane or not dangerous? 
LeFave and Scott, Criminal Law 322 (1972), quoting Goldstein, A., 
The Insanity Defense (1967). In his treatise Abraham Goldstein 
points out that in state statutory schemes using the term "sanity" 
alone, there is virtually nothing to explain it. Id at 147. A 
great many states, however, he notes, make no reference to recovery 
of sanity at all, but inquire only whether continued detention of 
an insanity acquitee is necessary for the safety of the patient 
or the public. Id at 148. 
Because the Utah statutory scheme makes no mention of the 
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issue of dangerousness or foreseeable harm, it was a violation of 
the appellant's right to due process of law for the trial court to 
consider these factors and arbitrarily determine that they apply. 
It was also error for the court to consider in its decision of this 
matter, the desire of the psychiatrists, prosecutor, and the court 
to have this case litigated so that the Supreme Court and/or the 
Utah Legislature might respond with a more definite standard for 
review or with more "satisfactory" requirements for review and 
provisions for conditional release.l 
1 
Prosecutor discussing the possibility of conditional 
release (7/18/80 T.11,14): "It will take a little bit of aborting 
the law to a degree, because I don't think the law really covers 
it. . . There is some basis for the statutory position that we 
don't have a better alternative, then we better keep Mr. Jacob 
there or adopt some type of a program, maybe change the law our-
selves or force the legislature into some type of situaion where 
they can change the law to coincide with the needs of Mr. Jacob. 
Dr. LeBegue was asked, 'Ts it your desire to have this 
matter litigated by the Supreme Court, that you might have a 
middle ground that you have been asking for or wish to see enacted 
somewhere?" He answered, "It is indicated that for treatment 
reasons that middle ground should be available." (7/18/80 T.41) 
Dr. Austin was asked, "What I am trying to get at, really, 
doctor, is why have you indicated in the final sentence of the 
letter, ·we cannot certify to the court that he's recovered from 
his mental illness? I am trying to find the underlying basis and 
why you are saying that, why, when he is on medication, he's fine." 
He answered, "The underlying reason is that there is absolutely 
no standard at thi~ point for us to certify that he is recovered 
from his mental illness. Therefore, we are quite willing to 
present all the information to the court. We are saying the 
psychological manifestations are in remission and therefore he is 
recovered to that extent. However, we feel, based on our best 
medical knowledge, that the biochemical disorder is still there, 
therefore he isn't recovered from that part of the mental illness, 
and we are willing to present that information and then let the 
court decide whether that recovery from mental illness actually 
means [sic] in this state." (7/22/81 T.14) (Footnote continued.) 
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It may be quite proper for state mental health authorities 
and the state's prosecuting authorities and trial judges to encourage 
law reform and the enactment of statutes which recognize the problems 
of the mentally ill and the ~dvances in the treatment of schizo-
phrenia and other mental illnesses. But, depriving David Jacob of 
his liberty by refusing and neglecting to apply· the stautuory standard 
in effect at the time the crime which gave rise to his incarceration 
was connnitted, is not a proper means of such encouragement. Any 
future judicial or statutory changes would only apply to the 
appellant if they operate in favor of his substantial right to his 
liberty. 
III 
THE STANDARD FOR DETERMINING WHETHER THE 
APPELLANT HAS BEEN "RESTORED TO SANITY" 
MUST BE BASED ON THE STANDARD DEFINED BY 
§76-2-305(1). 
Section 76-2-305(1) provides: 
Mental disease or defect.--(1) In any 
prosecution for an offense, it shall be a 
defense that the defendant, at the time of 
the prescribed conduct, as a result of mental 
disease or defect, lacked substantial capacity 
either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his 
conduct or to conform his conduct to the re uire-
ments of law. (Emphasis added. 
1 continued 
The court's order of August 7, 1981: Since there is no 
likelihood that a cure for defendant's illness will be discovered 
soon, the above ruling may well result in the lifetime institut~on­
alization of an individual who could function adequately, and with-
out danger, in. the community, if his medication were carefully and 
closely supervised. However, no means of lawful supervision appears 
to exist· at this time, and some revision of existing law would seem 
to be required before the defendant in his present condition could 
be released. 
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The verdict against the appellant was entered pursuant 
to former §77-33-4 (replaced July 1, 1980 with §77-35-2(a) providing 
for a not guilty by reason of mental illness verdict). §77-33-4 
provided: 
When the defendant is acquitted on the ground 
that he was insane at the time of the commission 
of the act charged, the verdict must be "not 
guilty by reason of insanity." 
The procedure to follow such a verdict was set out in 
§ 76-24-15 and § 76-24-16, supra. Thus the context in which "recovered 
his- sanity" was used, directly related to insanity as a criminal 
defense and is the only standard available to the court under the 
applicable criminal law and procedure. 
If this court finds that there is no standard or that 
what standard there is, is too vague for the court to be able to 
ascertain it's meaning, then §76-24-15 and 16 must be deemed 
unconstitutional and the appellant must be released. 
A statute violates the first essential of due process 
if it is so vague that persons of common intelligence must necessarily 
guess at its meaning. State v. Packard, 122 Utah 369, 340 P.2d 
561 (1952), State v. Andazola, 95 N.M. 430, 622 P.2d 1050 (1981). 
A statute meets due process requirements if it provides explicit 
standards to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. 
A statute which fails to provide such standards is unconstitutionally 
vag.U;e. State v. Rhodes, 92 Wash. 2d 755, 600 P.2d 1264 (1979). 
See Connally, supra. 
In Walonsky v. Balson, 58 Ohio App. 2d 25, 387 N.E.2d 
625 (1976) the Ohio Court of Appeals dealt with an Ohio statutory 
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scheme similar to Utah's. In that case, an insanity acquitee was 
seeking release from commitment to the state hospital. The Ohio 
Code Section 2945.39 provided for release "when a patient's sanity 
has been restored." Under this language the court held that the 
issue was "not whether the petitioner may still be dangerous to 
himself or society or whether he still is mentally deficient or 
mentally ill, but whether he is legally sane." The Ohio definition 
of legal sanity was established in State v. Staten, 25 Ohio St.2d 
107, 267 N.E. 2d 122 (1971). The Wolonsky court applied that 
definition and held that the question was 'whether he now has the 
capacity either to know the wrongfulness of his conduct or to 
conform his conduct to the requirements of law." 387 N.E.2d at 
625,626. 
Ohio at the time of this decision, had no provision for , 
conditional release. The court held without discussing any of the 
particular facts of diagnosis, medication, or the previous 
criminal history of the patient, that a person restored to sanity 
[in fact admitting that he had been restored to sanity] though 
the use of drugs which he must continue to take to remain sane, 
was not sane within the meaning of the statute." Id at 627. 
In 1978, the Ohio Code was changed to provide for a 
hearing to determine whether a person is mentally ill and the 
least restrictive commitment alternative consistent with the 
public safely and the welfare of the person. Ohio R.C. 2945.39 
and 2945.40. 
Approximately two-thirds of the states have provisions 
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for conditional release of an insanity acquitee. All the states 
have systems of indefinite detention. Goldstein, supra at 150. 
It is very difficult to ignore the issue of whether a person will 
continue to be nondangerous when a state has no provision for 
conditional release. An insanity acquitee is found innocent for 
lack of capacity to formulate mens rea, yet the presence of an 
actus rea and the possibility of a potential future actus rea 
means that though innocent, he continues to be controlled by the 
processes of ~he criminal law. This can make him subject to 
deprivation of his liberty not because of his current mental 
condition as it relates to sanity but because of the possfubility 
of future misbehavior. Comment, 27 Rutgers L.Rev.160 (1973). 
While it is difficult to ignore this potential for harm, 
the appellant contends it must be done in his case because as the 
law stands in Utah it is not a valid basis of consideration. To 
take it into account and at the same time maintain it shouldn't 
be taken into account as the Wolonsky court did amounts to a legal 
absurdity and ignores common logic and the ordinary meaning of 
language. A person is -either restored to sanity or not restored 
to sanity. A person is either able to appreciate the wrongfulness 
of his conduct and conform his conduct to the requirements of the 
law or he is not. 
IV 
THE COURT SHOULD HAVE FOUND THAT THE FACTS 
IN THIS CASE SATISFY THE REQUIREMENT THAT 
THE APPELLANT'S SANITY HAS BEEN RESTORED. 
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TO HOLD OTHERWISE AMOUNTS TO AN UNCONSTUTIONAL 
INCARCERATION BASED ON STATUS. 
All the testimony by the expert witnesses was that the 
appellant presently met the standard of being able to appreciate 
the wrongfulness of his conduct and being able to conform his 
conduct to the requirements of law. (Dr. Mirow and Dr. Austin, 
7/22/81 T.26,31,32, Dr. LeBegue 7/18/80 T.29). In addition, 
the testimony was that the appellant had been, for more than a 
year, free from any manifestations of his illness (7/22/81 T.3, 
8,12-14,21,31). To find, in view of that testimony, that the 
appellant has not been restored to his sanity amounts to subjecting 
him to a criminal commitment based on status. To hold that any 
insanity acquitee must be restored to his sanity so as to be 
unquestionably permanently sane amounts to an impossibility. 
Lex ~ intendit aliguid impossibile. (The law does not intend 
anything impossible.) 
The appellant would argue that the trial court was co~rect 
in its assessment that the definition of sanity must be a functional 
definition. Otherwise, the court stated, "we really would be 
dealing with an incarceration based on one's status as a chronic 
schizophrenic." (7/18/80 T.60). 
In Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 82 S.Ct.1417, 8 L.Ed. 
758 (1962), the United States Supreme Court examined a California 
statute which made it a crime to be a drug addict. The c~urt held 
that a state law which imprisons a person thus afflicted as a 
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criminal even though he has never touched any narcotic drug within 
the state, or been guilty of any irregular behavior there, inflicts 
a cru.e1 and unusual punishment in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 370 U.S. at 667, SL.Ed at 763. 
The Court based it's decision in part on the fact that 
narcotics addiction is an illness which can be contracted innocently 
or involuntarily. Id. 
The same is true of the illness with which the appellant 
is afficted. The recovery of sanity by a person previously insane 
can be effected by a variety of means. It can occur as a result 
of psychotherapy, administration of electric shock therapy or 
antipsychotic drugs, cessation of the use of mind altering chemicals 
or simply by an Act of God. 
The appellant contends that he has no more potential for 
a return to insanity than persons restored to their sanity in 
other ways. In fact, it can be argued he has less potential 
because he is fortunate enough to have a mental illness which can 
be and has been diagnosed and completely controlled by a readily 
available medication.2 
In the past, the appellant had had some difficulty finding 
the right medication to control his illness. At the July 18, 1980 
hearing, Dr. LeBegue testified that the appellant had not responded 
Schizophrenia is not a uncommon illness. It is estimated 
that 25% of all hospitable admissions for mental illnesses are 
diagno~ed as schiozophrenia. Approximately 1% of the people of 
t~e U~ited States will be diagnosed as schizophrenic during their 
lifetimes. Abnormal Psychology, Current Perspectives 271 (1972). 
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well to the long acting form of antipsycotics and would require 
lifetime daily treatment (7/18/80 T.19-22). But at the July 22, 
1981 hearing, Dr. Austin testified that the appellant was functioning 
extremely well on an injection of .5 cc's of prolixin every two 
weeks with an elimination of the psychological manifestations of 
his illness even though the biochemical disorder remained (7/22/81 
T.3,4,13,14). 
David Jacobs testified at the July 22, 1981 hearing that 
while in the past he was taking as much as 2.5 cc's of prolixin 
every two weeks and having substantial side effects of severe 
muscle contortions and an inability to control his tongue, that 
presently he was having no side effects, that the trouble had been 
getting the right amount of the right medication, and that on his 
present: dose he did not feel medicated (July 22, 1981 T.27-29,30). 
See AMA Drug Evaluations, Third Edition (1977) for overview of 
various antipsycotic agents. 
' 
The New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Maik, 60 N.J.203,287 
A.2d 715 (1973), dealt with the New Jersey statute which required 
the court fo find that a person had been "restored to reason". 
N.J. Stat. Ann. §2A-163-3, 163-2 (1971). The case concerned a 
person who had suffered a psychotic, schizophrenic break as a 
result of using hallicinogenic drugs. The court held that restora-
tion to reason occurs when the underlying latent condition or 
illness precipitating the defendant's psycotic episode is removed 
or effectively neutralized. 287 A.2d at 723. The court rejected 
a standard of mere remission, because the cause and duration of __ a 
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spontaneous remission is unknown. Id at 722-23. 
The appellant contends that he has experienced since the 
time of his offense, not only a remission but also an effective 
neutralization of the chemical disorder with which he is afflicted. 
This has come about because the doctors have finally found the 
best medication for the appellant which he has now been on for 
more than a year. There is absolutely nothing more the appellant 
can do to show or prove himself more sane that he has done already. 
To continue to punish him for being unable to do this and for being 
afflicted with a disease which he has through no fault of his own 
is the essence of cruel and unusual punishment. Under absolutely 
no other standard of sanity in the law would there be any question 
as to David Jacob's sanity in his present condition. He would 
undoubtedly be found sane enough to write a will, make a contract, 
be a witness, get married, commit a crime, and stand trial for 
that crime. Would a jury find him not guilty of that crime on 
the basis that the court has found that he is not sane? Certainly 
not. All the experts have testified that he is sane for that 
purpose. 
The appellant recognizes that if he is given his liberty 
there will be a possibility that he will not continue to receive 
the medication which neutralizes his disease. The law would not 
be powerless in the face of such an eventuality . The civil and 
criminal laws would still apply to the appellant as they do to 
every other citizen. 
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Risk cannot be eliminated from the processes of law, but 
laws are in effect to cover such risk. 
If the appellant is to be sentenced to an incarceration 
based on pa.st misdeeds it must be after a criminal conviction. 
The trial court found that the appellant is sane in his present 
condition. The trial court's ruling, in effect, sentences the 
appellant to a possible life long commitment based on the possibility 
of future misdeeds because of the specific way by which he has been 
restored to his sanity. But it is the only way he can be restored 
to his sanity. Thus it is an incarceration based on his statute 
as a sane person with schizophrenia, a mental illness for which 
he bears no responsibility. This is precisely the kind of incarer-
ation for status which was condemned by the United States Supreme 
Court in Robinson v. California, supra. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in it's application of §77-14-5 to 
this case by basing its order on whether the appellant has recovered 
from his mental illness. The court should have applied former 
§77-24-15 and §77-24-16 and inquired whether the appellant's sanity 
has been restored. The court erred in using the standard of 
sanity "of being reasonably expected to not be a threat or a danger 
of harm to himself or others in the foreseeable future." The court 
should have used a definition of sanity as it is defined in §76-2-305 
(1) as "being able to appreciate the wrongfulness of one's conduct 
and conform one's conduct to the requirements of law." 
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If the proper standards had been used the court should 
have found, based on all the evidence, that the appellant has 
been restored to his sanity and ordered him released from the 
custody of Utah State Hosptial. 
The appellant requests relief from these errors of the 
'trial court in the form of an order releasing him from the Utah 
State ~ospital since, according to all the evidence, his sanity 
has been restored. In the alternative, the appellant requests an 
order remanding this matter to the trial court for further proceed-
ings consistent with the proper standards of law. 
Respectfully submitted this 
I~ ~ day of D£,~rn-kv , 1982, 
DELIVERED a. copy of the foregoing to the Attorney General's 
Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, 
this day of 
---
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